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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 92-114
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CARDINAL CHEMICAL COMPANY, etc., et al., PE-
TITIONERS v. MORTON INTERNATIONAL, INC.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the federal circuit
[May 17, 1993]

  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The question presented is whether the affirmance by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit of a finding that
a patent has not been infringed is a sufficient reason for
vacating a declaratory judgment holding the patent
invalid.
  Respondent, Morton International, Inc. (Morton), is the
owner of two patents on chemical compounds used in
polyvinyl chloride (PVC).  In 1983 Morton filed this
action in the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina alleging that petitioners, Cardinal
Chemical Company and its affiliates (Cardinal), had
infringed those patents.  Cardinal filed an answer denying
infringement and a counterclaim for a declaratory judg-
ment that the patents are invalid.  While this case was
pending in the District Court, Morton filed two other
actions against other alleged infringers of the same
patents.  One was filed in the Eastern District of Louisi-
ana, the other in the District of Delaware.  The defen-
dants in both cases, like Cardinal, filed counterclaims for
declaratory judgments that the patents were invalid.  Of
the three, the Louisiana case was tried first and, in 1988,
resulted in a judgment for the defendant finding no
infringement and declaring the patents invalid.  On
appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the finding of no
infringement but vacated the judgment of invalidity.
The Delaware case is still pending.
  In 1990 this case proceeded to a 5-day bench trial.  The
South Carolina District Court concluded, as had the
Louisiana District Court, that the patentee had failed to
prove infringement and that the defendant-counterclaimant
had proved by clear and convincing evidence that both
patents were invalid.  Accordingly, the Court mandated
two separate judgments: one dismissing the action for
infringement with prejudice, and another on the counter-
claim, declaring the patents invalid.
  Again, Morton appealed to the Federal Circuit, challeng-
ing both the dismissal of its infringement claim and the
judgment of invalidity.  Cardinal filed a cross-appeal
contending that it was entitled to an award of fees
pursuant to 35 U. S. C. 285 and that Morton should be
sanctioned for prosecuting a frivolous appeal. The defen-
dant in the third, Delaware, case filed a brief amicus
curiae urging the Court to affirm the judgment of invalid-
ity.  Again, however, after affirming the dismissal of the
infringement claim, the Federal Circuit vacated the
declaratory judgment.  It explained:
     -Since we have affirmed the district court's holding
that the patents at issue have not been infringed, we
need not address the question of validity.  Vieau v.
Japax, Inc., 823 F. 2d 1510, 1517, 3 USPQ2d 1094,
1100 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  Accordingly, we vacate the
holding of invalidity.-  959 F. 2d 948, 952 (CA Fed.
1992).
The court also ruled that Morton was not liable for fees
because it had advanced an argument that -apparently it
was not in a position to raise earlier.-  Ibid.  Judge
Lourie concurred in the result, but believed the parties
were entitled to an affirmance of the invalidity holding -so
that they can plan their future affairs accordingly.-  Id.,
at 954.
  Both parties then filed petitions for rehearing, arguing
that the court should have decided the validity issue
instead of vacating the District Court's declaratory judg-
ment;  they also filed suggestions for rehearing en banc,
urging the Court of Appeals to reconsider its post-1987
practice of routinely vacating a declaratory judgment of
invalidity whenever noninfringement is found.  Over the
dissent of three of its judges, the court declined those
suggestions.  Chief Judge Nies filed a thorough explana-
tion of that dissent; she found no -justification for our
Vieau decision either legally or as a `policy'. . . .  The
parties can now look only to the Supreme Court for
correction.-  967 F. 2d 1571, 1578 (CA Fed. 1992).
  Cardinal filed a petition for certiorari asserting that the
Federal Circuit errs in applying a per se rule to what
should be a discretionary matter.  Pet. for Cert. 13.
Morton did not oppose the grant of certiorari, but instead
pointed out that it also had an interest in having the
validity issue adjudicated.  It explained that, after the
Federal Circuit had twice refused substantive review of
findings that its two patents were invalid, the patents
have been
-effectively stripped of any power in the marketplace.
If Morton were to proceed against another infringer,
the district court, in all likelihood would accept the
twice-vacated invalidity holdings, just as the district
court below adopted wholesale the [Louisiana] district
court's invalidity holdings, without any independent
evaluation as to whether those holdings were correct.
Further, any future accused infringer would, in all
likelihood, argue for an award of attorney's fees as
Cardinal has done here, on the ground that Morton
should have known better than sue on an `invalid
patent' . . . .  The value of Morton's patents is there-
fore essentially zero-effectively not enforceable and
viewed with a jaundiced eye by competitors and
district courts alike.  [Morton] has lost valuable
property rights . . . without due process of law.-
Brief for Respondent 16-17.
  Because the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals from all United States District Courts in
patent litigation, the rule that it applied in this case, and
has been applying regularly since its 1987 decision in
Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823 F. 2d 1510, is a matter of
special importance to the entire Nation.  We therefore
granted certiorari.  506 U. S. ___ (1992).

                      I
  The Federal Circuit's current practice of routinely
vacating declaratory judgments regarding patent validity
following a determination of noninfringement originated
in two cases decided by different panels of that Court on
the same day.  In Vieau, the patentee had appealed
adverse rulings on damages, infringement, and validity
and the alleged infringer had filed a cross-appeal asserting
that the District Court should have declared the patent
invalid.  After affirming the District Court's finding of
noninfringement, the Federal Circuit concluded:
     -Our disposition on the issue of infringement ren-
ders moot the appeal of the propriety of a directed
verdict on the issues of damages and willful infringe-
ment.  There is no indication that Japax's cross-
appeal on invalidity extends beyond the litigated
claims or the accused devices found to be
noninfringing.  Accordingly, we also dismiss the cross-
appeal as moot.  The judgment entered by the district
court with respect to each of the mooted issues is
therefore vacated.  It is affirmed with respect to
infringement.-  Id., at 1517.

  Judge Bennett filed a concurring opinion, fleshing out
this perfunctory holding and explaining that there was no
need to review the declaratory judgment of invalidity in
the absence of any -continuing dispute (such as the
presence or threat of further litigation) regarding other
claims or other accused devices that remain unresolved by
the finding of noninfringement.-
  In the second case, Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,
821 F. 2d 627 (CA Fed. 1987), the District Court had held
that the patent was not infringed and that the defendant-
counterclaimant had failed to prove invalidity.  On appeal,
the Court affirmed the noninfringement holding, and
vacated the judgment on the counterclaim as moot.  In his
opinion for the panel, Chief Judge Markey explained:
     -There being no infringement by J & J of any
asserted claim, there remains no case or controversy
between the parties.  We need not pass on the valid-
ity or enforceability of claims 1 and 2. . . .  [C]f.
Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359, 363-65 . . . (1943)
(`To hold a patent valid if it is not infringed is to
decide a hypothetical case,' but a counterclaim for
invalidity is not mooted where counterclaim deals
with additional patent claims and devices not involved
in the complaint and with license issues.).
          .       .      .      .      .
-The judgment that J & J has not proven claims 1
and 2 invalid or unenforceable is vacated and the
appeal from that judgment is dismissed as moot.-  Id.,
at 634.
A footnote emphasized that there was no longer any
dispute between the parties beyond the specific charge of
infringement that had been resolved by the finding of non-
infringement.
  The three opinions in Vieau and Fonar indicate that the
Federal Circuit's practice of vacating declaratory judg-
ments of patent validity (or invalidity) is limited to cases
in which the court is convinced that the finding of non-
infringement has entirely resolved the controversy between
the litigants by resolving the initial complaint brought by
the patentee.  The Federal Circuit has concluded that
in such cases the declaratory judgment is -moot- in a
jurisdictional sense, a conclusion that it considers dictated
by two of our earlier opinions, Electrical Fittings Corp. v.
Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241 (1939) and Altvater
v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943).  We therefore begin
with a comment on those two cases.

                     II
  In Electrical Fittings, the District Court held one claim
of a patent valid but not infringed.  The patentee was
content with that judgment, but the successful defendant
appealed, seeking a reversal of the finding of validity.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal based on the
rule that a prevailing party may not appeal from a
judgment in its favor.  We reversed, and held that al-
though the defendant could not compel the appellate court
to revisit the finding of validity (which had become
immaterial to the disposition of the case), it could demand
that the finding of validity be vacated.  That finding, we
explained, -stands as an adjudication of one of the issues
litigated.  We think the petitioners were entitled to have
this portion of the decree eliminated, and that the Circuit
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction, as we have held this
Court has, to entertain the appeal, not for the purpose of
passing on the merits, but to direct the reformation of the
decree.-  Electrical Fittings, 307 U. S., at 242 (footnotes
omitted).
  Our command that the validity decision be eliminated
was similar to the Federal Circuit's mandate in the Fonar
case (both cases suggest that an appellate court should
vacate unnecessary decisions regarding patent validity),
but the two cases are critically different.  The issue of
invalidity in Electrical Fittings was raised only as an
affirmative defense to the charge that a presumptively
valid patent had been infringed, not (as in Fonar, and
as here) as a basis for a counterclaim seeking a declara-
tory judgment of patent invalidity.  An unnecessary ruling
on an affirmative defense is not the same as the neces-
sary resolution of a counterclaim for a declaratory judg-
ment.
  In Altvater, as here, the defendant did file a counter-
claim seeking a declaratory judgment that the patent was
invalid.  The District Court found no infringement, but
also granted the declaratory judgment requested by the
defendant.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the non-in-
fringement holding but, reasoning that the validity issue
was therefore moot, vacated the declaratory judgment.
We reversed.  Distinguishing our holding in Electrical
Fittings, we wrote:
-To hold a patent valid if it is not infringed is to
decide a hypothetical case.  But the situation in the
present case is quite different.  We have here not only
bill and answer but a counterclaim.  Though the
decision of non-infringement disposes of the bill and
answer, it does not dispose of the counterclaim which
raises the question of validity. . . .  [T]he issue of
validity may be raised by a counterclaim in an in-
fringement suit.  The requirements of a case or
controversy are of course no less strict under the
Declaratory Judgments Act (48 Stat. 955, 28 U. S. C.
400) than in case of other suits.  But we are of the
view that the issues raised by the present counter-
claim were justiciable and that the controversy be-
tween the parties did not come to an end on the
dismissal of the bill for non-infringement, since their
dispute went beyond the single claim and the particu-
lar accused devices involved in that suit.-  319 U. S.,
at 363-364 (footnotes omitted; citations omitted).
Presumably because we emphasized, in the last clause
quoted, the ongoing nature of the Altvater parties' dispute,
the Federal Circuit has assumed that a defendant's
counterclaim under the Declaratory Judgment Act should
always be vacated unless the parties' dispute extends
beyond the terms of the patentee's charge of infringe-
ment.
  While both of our earlier cases are consistent with the
Federal Circuit practice established in Vieau and Fonar,
neither one required it.  Electrical Fittings did not involve
a declaratory judgment, and Altvater does not necessarily
answer the question whether, in the absence of an ongo-
ing dispute between the parties over infringement, an
adjudication of invalidity would be moot.  We now turn
to that question.

                     III
  Under its current practice, the Federal Circuit uniformly
declares that the issue of patent validity is -moot- if it
affirms the District Court's finding of noninfringement and
if, as in the usual case, the dispute between the parties
does not extend beyond the patentee's particular claim of
infringement.  That practice, and the issue before us,
therefore concerns the jurisdiction of an intermediate
appellate court-not the jurisdiction of either a trial court
or this Court.  In the trial court, of course, a party
seeking a declaratory judgment has the burden of estab-
lishing the existence of an actual case or controversy.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241
(1937).
  In patent litigation, a party may satisfy that burden,
and seek a declaratory judgment, even if the patentee has
not filed an infringement action.  Judge Markey has
described
-the sad and saddening scenario that led to enactment
of the Declaratory Judgment Act (Act), 28 U. S. C.
2201.  In the patent version of that scenario, a
patent owner engages in a danse macabre, brandish-
ing a Damoclean threat with a sheathed sword. . . .
Before the Act, competitors victimized by that tactic
were rendered helpless and immobile so long as the
patent owner refused to grasp the nettle and sue.
After the Act, those competitors were no longer
restricted to an in terrorem choice between the incurr-
ence of a growing potential liability for patent in-
fringement and abandonment of their enterprises; they
could clear the air by suing for a judgment that
would settle the conflict of interests.  The sole re-
quirement for jurisdiction under the Act is that the
conflict be real and immediate, i.e., that there be a
true, actual `controversy' required by the Act.-  Arrow-
head Industrial Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc. 846
F. 2d 731, 734-735 (CA Fed. 1988) (citations omitted).
Merely the desire to avoid the threat of a -scarecrow-
patent, in Learned Hand's phrase, may therefore be
sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the Declaratory
Judgment Act.  If, in addition to that desire, a party has
actually been charged with infringement of the patent,
there is, necessarily, a case or controversy adequate to
support jurisdiction of a complaint, or a counterclaim,
under the Act.  In this case, therefore, it is perfectly clear
that the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain
Cardinal's counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of
invalidity.
  It is equally clear that the Federal Circuit, even after
affirming the finding of noninfringement, had jurisdiction
to consider Morton's appeal from the declaratory judgment
of invalidity.  A party seeking a declaratory judgment of
invalidity presents a claim independent of the patentee's
charge of infringement.  If the District Court has jurisdic-
tion (established independently from its jurisdiction over
the patentee's charge of infringement) to consider that
claim, so does (barring any intervening events) the Feder-
al Circuit.
  There are two independent bases for this conclusion.
First, the Federal Circuit is not a court of last resort.  If
that court had jurisdiction while the case was pending
before it, the case remains alive (barring other changes)
when it comes to us.  The Federal Circuit's determination
that the patents were not infringed is subject to review
in this Court, and if we reverse that determination, we
are not prevented from considering the question of validity
merely because a lower court thought it superfluous.  As
a matter of practice, the possibility that we would grant
certiorari simply to review that Court's resolution of an
infringement issue is extremely remote, but as a matter
of law we could do so, and if we did, we could also reach
the declaratory judgment, as long as the parties continued
to dispute the issue of validity, as they do here.  As
this case demonstrates, nothing prevents us, as a jurisdic-
tional matter, from reviewing the Federal Circuit's disposi-
tion (even its vacatur) of the District Court's resolution of
the declaratory judgment counterclaim.
  Second, while the initial burden of establishing the trial
court's jurisdiction rests on the party invoking that
jurisdiction, once that burden has been met courts are
entitled to presume, absent further information, that
jurisdiction continues.  If a party to an appeal suggests
that the controversy has, since the rendering of judgment
below, become moot, that party bears the burden of
coming forward with the subsequent events that have
produced that alleged result.  See United States v. W. T.
Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 633 (1953).  In this case
Cardinal properly invoked the original jurisdiction of the
District Court, and Morton properly invoked the appellate
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.  That court unquestion-
ably had the power to decide all the issues raised on
Morton's appeal.  If, before the Court had decided the
case, either party had advised it of a material change in
circumstances that entirely terminated their controversy,
it would have been proper either to dismiss the appeal or
to vacate the entire judgment of the District Court.  Cf.
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39
(1950).  In fact, however, there was no such change in
this case.  The Federal Circuit's decision to rely on one
of two possible alternative grounds (noninfringement
rather than invalidity) did not strip it of power to decide
the second question, particularly when its decree was
subject to review by this Court.  Even if it may be good
practice to decide no more than is necessary to determine
an appeal, it is clear that the Federal Circuit had jurisdic-
tion to review the declaratory judgment of invalidity.  The
case did not become moot when that Court affirmed the
finding of noninfringement.

                     IV
  The Federal Circuit's practice is therefore neither
compelled by our cases nor supported by the -case or
controversy- requirement of Article III.  Of course, its
practice might nevertheless be supported on other
grounds.  The Courts of Appeal have significant authority
to fashion rules to govern their own procedures.  See, e.g.,
Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U. S. ___, ___
(1993) (slip op., at 10); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U. S. 140,
146-148 (1985).  Just as we have adhered to a practice
of deciding cases on statutory rather than constitutional
grounds when both alternatives are available, see, e.g.,
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building and
Construction Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988),
there might be a sufficient reason always to address the
infringement issue before passing on the patent's validity.
If, for example, the validity issues were generally more
difficult and time-consuming to resolve, the interest in the
efficient management of the Court's docket might support
such a rule.
  Although it is often more difficult to determine whether
a patent is valid than whether it has been infringed, there
are even more important countervailing concerns.  Perhaps
the most important is the interest of the successful
litigant in preserving the value of a declaratory judgment
that, as Chief Judge Nies noted, -it obtained on a valid
counterclaim at great effort and expense.-  A company
once charged with infringement must remain concerned
about the risk of similar charges if it develops and
markets similar products in the future.  Given that the
burden of demonstrating that changed circumstances
provide a basis for vacating the judgment of patent
invalidity rests on the party that seeks such action, there
is no reason why a successful litigant should have any
duty to disclose its future plans to justify retention of the
value of the judgment that it has obtained.
  Moreover, our prior cases have identified a strong public
interest in the finality of judgments in patent litigation.
In Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U. S.
327 (1945), we approved of the District Court's decision
to consider the question of validity even though it had
found that a patent had not been infringed.  Criticizing
the contrary approach taken by other courts, we stated
that -of the two questions, validity has the greater public
importance, Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 [CA2 1943)],
and the District Court in this case followed what will
usually be the better practice by inquiring fully into the
validity of this patent.-  Id., at 330.
  We also emphasized the importance to the public at
large of resolving questions of patent validity in Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Founda-
tion, 402 U. S. 313 (1971).  In that case we overruled
Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U. S. 638 (1936), which had held
that a determination of patent invalidity does not estop
the patentee from relitigating the issue in a later case
brought against another alleged infringer.  We also
commented at length on the wasteful consequences of
relitigating the validity of a patent after it has once been
held invalid in a fair trial, and we noted the danger
that the opportunity to relitigate might, as a practical
matter, grant monopoly privileges to the holders of invalid
patents.  As this case demonstrates, the Federal
Circuit's practice of routinely vacating judgments of
validity after finding noninfringement creates a similar
potential for relitigation and imposes ongoing burdens on
competitors who are convinced that a patent has been
correctly found invalid.
  Indeed, as Morton's current predicament illustrates, see
supra, at 5, the Federal Circuit's practice injures not only
the alleged infringer, and the public; it also may unfairly
deprive the patentee itself of the appellate review that is
a component of the one full and fair opportunity to have
the validity issue adjudicated correctly.  If, following a
finding of noninfringement, a declaratory judgment on
validity is routinely vacated, whether it invalidated the
patent (as in Vieau) or upheld it (as in Fonar), the
patentee may have lost the practical value of a patent
that should be enforceable against different infringing
devices.  The Federal Circuit's practice denies the patentee
such appellate review, prolongs the life of invalid patents,
encourages endless litigation (or at least uncertainty) over
the validity of outstanding patents, and thereby vitiates
the rule announced in Blonder-Tongue.
  In rejecting the Federal Circuit's practice we acknow-
ledge that factors in an unusual case might justify that
Court's refusal to reach the merits of a validity determina-
tion-a determination which it might therefore be appro-
priate to vacate.  A finding of noninfringment alone,
however, does not justify such a result.  Nor does any-
thing else in the record of this case.  The two patents at
issue here have been the subject of three separate law-
suits, and both parties have urged the Federal Circuit to
resolve their ongoing dispute over the issue of validity; it
would be an abuse of discretion not to decide that ques-
tion in this case.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to that
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.